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I. INTRODUCTION
HIS article surveys significant court decisions and developments in
employment law during the Survey period of November 1, 2007 to
October 31, 2008.
The discussion unfolds as follows. Part II examines in some detail a
recent Supreme Court of Texas decision discussing and ruling on an em-
ployee's claim that his employer unconstitutionally employed race-based
peremptory challenges in striking African-American jurors from the jury
venire in a race discrimination case. Part III turns to employment arbi-
tration and mandamus cases dealing with arbitration agreements and the
question whether certain provisions of such agreements were unconscion-
able and therefore unenforceable. Judicial interpretations and construc-
tions of the Texas Whistleblower Act are discussed in Part IV, including a
case presenting a matter of first impression concerning the definition and
meaning of that statute's anti-retaliation provision. Part V focuses on se-
lected employment-related torts decisions, and Part VI examines an in-
teresting case interpreting and applying, for the first time, the "safe
harbor" provision of the Texas Dram Shop Act.
II. JURY SELECTION AND RACE-BASED STRIKES
In Davis v. Fisk Electric Company,1 the Supreme Court of Texas con-
sidered an African-American employee's claim that, at the trial of his
race discrimination suit, his former employer unconstitutionally used per-
* Alumnae Law Center Professor of Law, University of Houston Law Center. J.D.,
The University of Pennsylvania Law School; B.A., Wilberforce University. The author
acknowledges and is thankful for the research support provided by the Alumnae Law
Center donors and the University of Houston Law Foundation.
1. 268 S.W.3d 508 (Tex. 2008).
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emptory challenges to strike five of six African Americans from the
venire. 2
Donald Davis's action alleged that the company's termination of his
employment as an assistant project manager violated 42 U.S.C. § 1981
and the Texas Labor Code. More specifically, Davis contended that his
supervisor used the word "nigger" when considering Davis's discharge.
3
At the conclusion of voir dire the employer peremptorily struck six mem-
bers of the venire-five of the six were African Americans. Citing and
relying on Batson v. Kentucky,4 Davis objected to the strikes; that objec-
tion was overruled by the trial court. A jury subsequently returned a
verdict in favor of the employer, and the employer's victory was affirmed
by the court of appeals.5
The supreme court, in an opinion authored by Chief Justice Wallace B.
Jefferson, concluded that two of the challenged strikes were based on
race and remanded the case for a new trial. Reviewing the trial court's
Batson ruling for abuse of discretion, 6 Chief Justice Jefferson noted that
the statistics in the case before the supreme court were "remarkable." '7
From the first twenty-eight venire members, four were struck "for cause
or by agreement" of the parties. The employer then used his peremptory
challenges to strike "five of the six African Americans (83%) but only
one (5.5%) of the eligible nonblack prospective jurors."8 Chief Justice
Jefferson remarked that "'happenstance is unlikely to produce this
disparity.' "
2. Id. at 510; see also TEX. R. Civ. P. 232, 233 (providing that each party in a civil
action may exercise six peremptory strikes and may challenge jurors "without assigning
any reason therefor").
3. See 268 S.W.3d at 510.
4. 476 U.S. 79 (1986). Batson held that prosecutorial challenges to potential jurors
solely because of the jurors' race or because it was assumed that black jurors would not be
able to impartially consider the state's prosecution of a black defendant were proscribed by
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; Batson, 476 U.S. at 97-98; see also Goode v. Shoukfeh, 943
S.W.2d 441, 447-48 (Tex. 1997) (explanations for the peremptory strikes of three African-
American jurors and one Latino juror were race-neutral and credible).
The Batson regime was later extended to civil cases, see Edmonson v. Leesville Con-
crete, Inc., 500 U.S. 614 (1991), and has been recognized and followed by the Texas Su-
preme Court. See Powers v. Palacios, 813 S.W.2d 489, 491 (Tex. 1991) ("[E]qual protection
is denied when race is a factor in counsel's exercise of a peremptory challenge to a prospec-
tive juror.").
5. See Davis v. Fisk Elec. Co., 187 S.W.3d 570, 577, 590 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 2006), rev'd, 268 S.W.3d 508 (Tex. 2008).
6. See 268 S.W.3d at 515; see also Goode, 943 S.W.2d at 446 ("A trial court abuses its
discretion if its decision 'is arbitrary, unreasonable, and without reference to guiding prin-
ciples."') (quoting Mercedes-Benz Credit Corp. v. Rhyne, 925 S.W.2d 664, 666 (Tex.
1996)).
7. 268 S.W.3d at 516. In noting and discussing the "remarkable" juty strike statistics
in Davis's case, the Chief Justice cited the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231 (2005), wherein a prosecutor employed peremptory chal-
lenges to exclude ninety-one percent of African-American venire members. See id. at 241.
8. 268 S.W.3d at 516. Chief Justice Jefferson also noted that the employer's sixth
peremptory strike removed a person of Asian descent. See id. at 516 n.5.
9. Id. at 516 (internal quotation marks, footnote, and citation omitted).
[Vol. 621098
Employment Law
Moving beyond these "remarkable" statistics, Chief Justice Jefferson
addressed the employer's explanation to the trial court for its peremptory
strike of Juror No. 12.10 According to the employer's counsel, during voir
dire questioning Juror No. 12 "reacted that corporations should be pun-
ished with the use of punitive damages" and "seemed to be too ready to
believe that Continental [Airlines, Juror No. 12's employer] has discrimi-
natory employment practices . . ."11 But Juror No. 12 "never verbally
responded to the questions about punitive damages, Chief Justice Jeffer-
son concluded.' 2 The employer also argued that Juror No. 12 displayed
"nonverbal cues" manifesting the juror's views on punishing corporations
with punitive damages. 13 Noting that the United States Supreme Court
recently upheld a Batson challenge to nonverbal conduct where the trial
judge did not make a finding concerning the prosecution's explanation
that an African-American potential juror was struck because of that indi-
vidual's nervous demeanor, 14 Chief Justice Jefferson opined that defer-
ence to the trial court in Davis's case was not warranted given the
absence of any finding with regard to Juror No. 12's nonverbal reaction. 15
Without such a finding "we cannot presume the trial court credited [the
employer's] explanation. '16
Moreover, the Chief Justice continued, the fact that the employer did
not question Juror No. 12 about the claimed nonverbal reaction and
failed "to strike a white juror who expressed verbally what [Juror No. 12]
purportedly did nonverbally, give[s] us pause. ' 17 The Chief Justice ex-
pressed concern that "permitting strikes based on an assertion that nefa-
rious conduct 'happened,' without identifying its nature and without any
additional record support, would strip Batson of meaning."' 18 "Nonverbal
conduct or demeanor, often elusive and always subject to interpretation,
may well mask a race-based strike."'19 Making clear that peremptory
challenges based on nonverbal conduct may be legitimate, Chief Justice
Jefferson instructed that the opportunity to rebut such a challenge must
be afforded to opposing counsel, the trial court must decide whether the
nonverbal conduct accusation "accurately describes what happened dur-
ing voir dire," and that there must be a record upon which appellate
courts can analyze the issue.20 Given the employer's failure to question
Juror No. 12 about "his purported reaction," and in light of the fact that
the employer did not strike a white juror who stated that he had no prob-
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 517.
13. Id.
14. See Snyder v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 1203 (2008).
15. 268 S.W.-3d at 518.
16. Id.
17. Id.; see also id. at 519 (noting that the employer did not strike "a white juror who
stated that he would not have a problem awarding punitive damages").





lem with punitive damages, Chief Justice Jefferson reasoned that "[t]hese
factors suggest that the stated reason-[Juror No. 12's] 'reaction' to puni-
tive damages-was pretextual. ' '21
As for the employer's contention that Juror No. 12, a seventeen-year
employee of Continental Airlines, too readily believed that Continental
discriminated against employees, Chief Justice Jefferson quoted and ex-
amined the colloquy between Juror No. 12 and the employer's counsel
and found no support for the explanation that Juror No. 12 had any such
belief.22 Indeed, the Chief Justice wrote:
[Juror No. 12], a longtime employee, stated that leaving his old job
for Continental was "a better move for him," and the only thing he
said about race discrimination cases was that he had never been in-
volved with one. At best, the record shows that [Juror No. 12] was
neutral about employment discrimination issues, providing no sup-
port for [the employer's] asserted reason for striking him.23
Chief Justice Jefferson then turned to the employer's strike of Juror
No. 5 and the company's explanation that Juror No. 5 was a musician who
had "the strongest reaction to this whole 'N' word issue" and laughed
when another juror stated that he had African-American friends.24 The
juror was a musician employed by a church, and the Court came to the
conclusion that the strike seemed to be "'based on a group bias where the
group trait is not shown to apply to the challenged juror specifically."' 25
Therefore, the Court found that the employer's strike of Juror No. 5 due
to his occupation suggested nothing more than a "pretext" for race
discrimination.
As for Juror No. 5's reaction when asked about the "n-word" during
voir dire (recall that Davis alleged that his supervisor had used that
word), Chief Justice Jefferson's examination of the record convinced him
that Juror No. 5 and two other African Americans struck because of their
response to questioning about this "universally offensive epithet"2 6
"were no more offended" than three nonblack members of the venire
who were seated on the jury.27 Accordingly, Juror No. 5's "'strong reac-
tion' in the form of his verbal responses to [the employer's] questions was
21. Id. at 519.
22. The Court did not consider the employer's argument that Juror No. 12's voir dire
responses about his own experience with discrimination justified a peremptory strike, as
that reason had not been presented to the trial court. See id. at 519, 521.
23. Id. at 520. Juror No. 12's job responsibilities included the duties of what he called
"aide-of-counsel," which, according to Juror No. 12, was "just like having a union without
the union. We're the representative between management and the person." Id. The em-
ployer's concern about Juror No. 12's representational activities "(a concern that was never
expressed at trial)" did "not explain why [the employer] failed to strike (or even question)
juror 27, a white woman, about her membership in a union." Id. at 521.
24. Id. The Court did not rely, as dit the court of appeals, on Juror No. 5's voir dire
statements that he had been the victim of racial discrimination, noting that the employer
did not cite those statements as a basis for striking him. See id. at 524.
25. Id. at 522 (quoting Whitsey v. State, 796 S.W.2d 707, 716 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989)).
26. Id. at 522 n.12.
27. Id. at 522.
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no stronger than some of his nonblack counterparts, and [the employer's]
strike on this basis suggests pretext. '28
Concerning Juror No. 5's laughter when another juror stated that he
had black friends, Chief Justice Jefferson noted that the employer never
asked Juror No. 5 about the laughter, again indicating that the "reason
may be pretextual. 29 Further, the Chief Justice pointed out that laughter
was relied on as the basis for striking only one other potential juror, who
was also an African American. 30 "While [Juror No. 5's] laughter appears
at first blush to be a plausible, race-neutral reason for striking him, when
we examine the totality of the circumstances ...we cannot agree that
[Juror No. 5's] race was irrelevant. '3 1
Finding a statistical disparity and "unequal treatment of comparable
jurors" 32 warranting reversal of the jury's verdict for the employer, Chief
Justice Jefferson acknowledged that "peremptory strikes, often based on
instinct rather than reason, can be difficult to justify,"33 and emphasized
that the employer's counsel's "failure to do so here does not suggest per-
sonal racial animosity on his part."'3 4 Although "race may even serve as a
rough proxy for partiality[,] ... whatever the strategic advantages of that
practice, the Constitution forbids it.''35
Davis is an important and interesting exemplar of the Texas Supreme
Court's willingness to closely scrutinize claims of race-based peremptory
challenges and the unconstitutional targeting of potential jurors of color.
Not deferring to the lower courts' overruling of the plaintiff's Batson
challenges, Chief Justice Jefferson and the supreme court noted the statis-
tical disparity evident in the treatment of African-American and white
jurors and examined and critiqued the employer's purportedly race-neu-
tral reasons for its peremptory challenges, finding pretexual masks for
race-based strikes in a race discrimination case which would require ju-
rors to hear and evaluate, among other things, the significance of a super-
visor's alleged use of the "n-word. '36 Whether and how the supreme
court will apply Davis in future employment discrimination (and other)
cases, and whether the supreme court will extend the analysis to sex and




32. Id. at 525.
33. Id. (citing Miller-El, 545 U.S. at 252).
34. Id.
35. Id. Justice Scott A. Brister, concurring only in the judgment, disagreed with the
supreme court's conclusion that the employer's peremptory strikes were racially moti-
vated. In his view, peremptory strikes do "provide an opportunity for discrimination. But
they also provide an opportunity to accuse an opponent of discrimination and get a new
trial if the first one turns out badly." Id. at 526 (Brister, J., concurring). In a part of his
opinion joined by Justice David Medina, Justice Brister argued that the "only way to re-
duce or eliminate discrimination and suspicion is to reduce or eliminate these strikes." Id.
at 529; see also id. at 531 ("[W]e in Texas must consider whether peremptory strikes are
worth the price they impose.").
36. See generally id. at 508.
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other discrimination claims,37 are important issues for plaintiffs, employ-
ers, and potential jurors of all races, and for judges engaged in the super-
vision of parties' use of peremptory challenges under and within the
Batson regime.
III. EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION
In re Poly-America, L.P.38 addressed two questions: (1) whether cer-
tain employment arbitration agreement provisions contained in an em-
ployment contract were unconscionable; and (2) if so, whether the
employment contract's severability clause preserved the right to
arbitration.
Johnny Luna commenced his employment with Poly-America, L.P. in
October 1998. At that time he signed an agreement to submit "all claims
or disputes" to arbitration, and signed an amended arbitration agreement
in 2002;39 both agreements were governed by the Federal Arbitration Act
(FAA).40 The arbitration agreement provided, among other things, that
employees would split the costs of arbitration with the employer (subject
to a cap), 4 1 that discovery was limited,4 2 and that punitive damages and
reinstatement remedies under Texas workers' compensation law could
not be awarded in arbitration.4 3
Suffering a work-related neck injury in late 2002, Luna filed a workers'
compensation claim and, after receiving physical therapy, was released
for and returned to light-duty work two weeks later.4 4 Continuing to ex-
perience pain, he took vacation time.45 Told by the company doctor that
he would lose his job if he did not return to work and stop receiving
workers' compensation, Luna returned to work and saw that another in-
dividual was being trained for his job.46 According to Luna, he was
harassed by his supervisor. 47 A month after his return to work he in-
37. See J.E.B. v. Ala., 511 U.S. 127, 129 (1994) (holding that intentional sex discrimina-
tion by state actors in the use of peremptory strikes violates the Equal Protection Clause).
38. 262 S.W.3d 337 (Tex. 2008).
39. Id. at 344.
40. Id.; see also 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (2006).
41. Arbitration-associated fees, including mediation and arbitrator's fees and court re-
porter and hearing place fees, were to be split between the parties, with a cap for the
employee's share set at the employee's gross compensation earned in the employee's high-
est earning month in the twelve months prior to the time of the arbitrator's issuance of his
or her award. See 262 S.W.3d at 344.
42. Each party was limited to twenty-five interrogatories (including sub-parts), twenty-
five document production or inspection requests, and one oral deposition not exceeding six
hours. Written depositions and requests for admissions were not allowed, and discovery of
the employee's or the employer's financial information was not permitted except for em-
ployee earnings where the employee sought to recover lost pay, back pay, or front pay. See
id.
43. Pursuant to the agreement, an arbitrator could not award punitive, exemplary, or
liquidated damages and was not authorized to order an employee's reinstatement. See id.






formed that supervisor that his neck was still bothering him and that he
would be returning to the company doctor; Luna was fired on his next
regularly scheduled work day.48
Luna filed suit alleging that his firing constituted an unlawful retalia-
tory discharge under the Texas Workers' Compensation Act 49 and sought
reinstatement and punitive damages.50 Texas's workers' compensation
law provides, among other things, that persons who violate the statute are
liable for the reasonable damages incurred by the employee resulting
from the violation, and that an unlawfully discharged employee is entitled
to reinstatement in her former position of employment. 51 In addition,
Luna sought a declaratory judgment that the aforementioned arbitration
agreement violated public policy and was therefore unenforceable. The
employer responded to Luna's suit by filing a motion to compel arbitra-
tion. When that motion was granted by a trial court, Luna sought and
obtained a writ of mandamus from the court of appeals, with that court
holding that the arbitration agreement's fee-splitting and limited-reme-
dies provisions were substantively unconscionable. 52
Reviewing the appellate court's ruling, the Texas Supreme Court held
that the arbitration agreement's provision eliminating statutory remedies
under the Workers' Compensation Act was unenforceable, and that the
provision was severable from the agreement. 53 Writing for the supreme
court, Justice Harriet O'Neill noted that arbitration agreements are "his-
torically favored" and "are generally enforceable under Texas law," and
that "there is nothing per se unconscionable about an agreement to arbi-
trate employment disputes . . . . -54 But unconscionable contracts, includ-
ing arbitration agreements, are unenforceable under state law where,
"'given the parties' general commercial background and the commercial
needs of the particular trade or case, the clause involved is so one-sided
that it is unconscionable under the circumstances existing when the par-
ties made the contract." 55
Focusing on arbitration agreements covering statutory claims, Justice
O'Neill stated that such an agreement "is valid so long as the arbitration
agreement does not waive the substantive rights and remedies the statute
affords and the arbitration procedures are fair, such that the employee
may effectively vindicate his statutory rights."' 56 The Justice referenced
federal court decisions declaring that an arbitration agreement covering
48. See id.
49. See TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 451.001 - .003 (Vernon 2006 & Supp. 2008).
50. 262 S.W.3d at 345.
51. See § 451.002(a) - (b) (Vernon 2006 & Supp. 2008).
52. See In re Johnny Luna, 175 S.W.3d 315, 322, 324 (Tex. App-Houston [1st Dist.]
2004), mand. conditionally granted, 262 S.W.3d 337 (Tex. 2008).
53. 262 S.W.3d at 345.
54. Id. at 348.
55. Id. (quoting In re FirstMerit Bank, N.A., 52 S.W.3d 749, 757 (Tex. 2001)); see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208, cmt. a (1981) (setting out factors relevant
to the unconscionability determination).
56. 262 S.W.3d at 349.
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federal statutory rights is not enforceable when a party must "forgo the
substantive rights afforded by the statute" and not just resolve a statutory
claim "in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum. '57 As she noted, a
claim is not arbitrable where Congress has expressed its intent to exempt
that claim from arbitration or where the waiver of statutory rights is ex-
cessive. 58 "State courts, bound by the FAA under the supremacy clause,
have more limited power, as the FAA preempts state laws that specifi-
cally disfavor arbitration. '59
The at-issue arbitration agreement contained provisions prohibiting an
arbitrator's order of reinstatement and award of punitive damages.
Agreeing with Luna that these provisions were unenforceable, Justice
O'Neill "view[ed] the anti-retaliation provisions of the Workers' Com-
pensation Act as a non-waivable legislative system for deterrence neces-
sary to the nondiscriminatory and effective operation of the Texas
Workers' Compensation system as a whole .... ",60 Noting further that
Luna asserted that the employer acted with actual malice in terminating
his employment, and that the Workers' Compensation Act provides for
punitive damages for such misconduct, O'Neill wrote that "[plermitting
an employer to contractually absolve itself of this statutory remedy would
undermine the deterrent purpose of the Workers' Compensation Act's
anti-retaliation provisions. '61 Enforcing the remedies-limiting portions
of the arbitration agreement would undo the "carefully balanced compet-
ing interests" of employees, employers, and insurance carriers considered
in the design of the workers' compensation system.62 The supreme court
declined to allow the employer to opt out of that system and "avoid the
Act's penalties by conditioning employment upon waiver of the very pro-
visions designed to protect employees who have been the subject of
wrongful retaliation. ' 63 In Justice O'Neill's words: "Such waivers would
allow subscribing employers to enjoy the Act's limited-liability benefits
while exposing workers to exactly the sort of costs-of injuries paid for
by the employee for fear of retribution for making a claim-that the Act
is specifically designed to shift onto the employer. '64
57. Id. (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S.
614, 628 (1985)).
58. Id. (citing Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991), and
Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 628).
59. Id. (citing Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492 n.9 (1987), and Jack B. Anglin Co. v.
Tippus, 842 S.W.2d 266, 271 (Tex. 1992)).
60. Id. at 352.
61. Id.
62. Id. As the supreme court notes, in enacting the Workers' Compensation Act, the
Texas legislature provided "a mechanism by which workers could recover from subscribing
employers without regard to the workers' own negligence ... while limiting the employers'
exposure to uncertain, possibly high damage awards permitted under the common law
.... .Id. at 350. Given the purposes of the statute, it is "'the settled policy of this State to
construe liberally the provisions of the... law, in order to effectuate the purpose for which
it is enacted."' Id. (quoting Huffman v. S. Underwriters, 128 S.W.2d 4, 6 (Tex. 1939)).
63. Id. at 352.
64. Id. at 353.
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In the remaining pages of her opinion for the supreme court, Justice
O'Neill held that the arbitration agreement's fee-splitting provision was
not substantively unconscionable. Noting that fee-splitting provisions in
employment contracts have been condemned by some courts65 and have
been found to be unenforceable per se by others,66 Justice O'Neill agreed
that such "provisions that operate to prohibit an employee from fully and
effectively vindicating statutory rights are not enforceable."'6 7 Rejecting
the per se unenforceable position, the Justice adopted an approach re-
quiring "some evidence that a complaining party will likely incur arbitra-
tion costs in such an amount as to deter enforcement of statutory rights in
the arbitral forum. '68 Luna estimated that his share of arbitration fees
could reach $3,300 and argued that that amount would prevent him from
pursuing his case; the employer argued that, because the costs of litigating
the case would be much higher, the arbitration agreement's cap on the
employee's share of arbitration fees would benefit Luna and would not
be unconscionable. Justice O'Neill concluded that Luna had not demon-
strated that he would be unable to pursue his claim because of the esti-
mated costs of arbitration, opining that any cost-related preclusion of
Luna's enforcement of his non-waivable statutory rights could be ad-
dressed by an arbitrator who "is better situated to assess whether the cost
provision in this case will hinder effective vindication of Luna's statutory
rights and, if so, to modify the contract's terms accordingly. '6 9
Turning to the arbitration agreement's limits on discovery, an issue of
first impression for the supreme court, Justice O'Neill determined that, in
cases involving non-waivable substantive rights, "ex ante limitations on
discovery that unreasonably impede effective prosecution of such rights
are likewise unenforceable. ' 70 But who should decide whether the un-
reasonable impediment standard has been met? Justice O'Neill ex-
pressed her doubt that courts evaluating claims and limits on discovery
prior to the commencement of arbitration were best situated to answer
the question posed in the preceding sentence. Discovery needs in a spe-
cific case presenting particular claims and defenses can be assessed by the
arbitrator, Justice O'Neill concluded, and any discovery limitations
preventing vindication of the employee's non-waivable rights and depriv-
ing the employee of a fair opportunity to present a claim would be uncon-
scionable and would not bind the arbitrator. 71
Having invalidated as substantively unconscionable and void the reme-
dies-limiting provisions of the arbitration agreement while rejecting
Luna's challenge to the fee-splitting and discovery-limiting parts of the
65. Id. at 355 (citing Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 90 - 91
(2000)).
66. Id. at 355 - 56 (citing Cole v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1483 - 85 (D.C.
Cir. 1995)).
67. Id. at 356.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 357.




agreement, Justice O'Neill determined that the agreement's severability
clause 72 expressed the parties' intent "that unconscionable provisions be
excised where possible. '7 3 As the "main purpose of the agreement" is
the submission of disputes to arbitration and not courts, "[e]xcising the
unconscionable provisions we have identified will not defeat or under-
mine this purpose, which we have upheld in the context of agreements to
arbitrate employment disputes."' 74 Accordingly, arbitration of Luna's
claim was compelled pursuant to the conditionally granted writ of
mandamus. 75
Another motion to compel arbitration and petition for a writ of manda-
mus was at issue in Wee Tots Pediatrics, P.A. v. Morohunfola.76 In that
case Dr. Adunni Morohunfola worked for the employer until her employ-
ment agreement (which contained an arbitration provision) 77 expired on
August 31, 2006. Pursuant to the agreement's covenant not to compete
provision Dr. Morohunfola agreed that, during her employment with
Wee Tots and for a period of twelve months after the cessation of that
employment, she would not engage in or become associated with a pedi-
atric group practice or other designated entities and would not work
within a twenty-five mile radius of the employer's business.7 8 According
to Wee Tots, after her contract expired Dr. Morohunfola joined another
pediatric practice in violation of the non-compete covenant. Wee Tots
sued the doctor; the doctor then sued Wee Tots alleging various breaches
of the employment agreement's compensation provision. 79 Resolving its
claims against Dr. Morohunfola in mediation, Wee Tots filed a motion to
compel arbitration of the physician's claims; that motion was denied by
the trial court.
On appeal, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals, in an opinion by Justice
Dixon W. Holman, held that the arbitration agreement in the employ-
ment contract covered the doctor's claims. Those claims "fall within the
broad scope of the arbitration agreement requiring arbitration of 'all con-
troversies which may arise between the parties,' including disputes arising
'in any manner' relating to the Agreement."8 0 Dr. Morohunfola was
bound by the express terms of the agreement, as a "'person who signs a
contract must be held to have known what words were used in the con-
72. See id. at 359 ("Should any term of this Agreement be declared illegal, unenforce-
able, or unconscionable, the remaining terms of the Agreement shall remain in full force
and effect.").
73. Id. at 360.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 361.
76. 268 S.W.3d 784, 787 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2008, no pet.).
77. The arbitration agreement provided that "[a]ll controversies which may arise be-
tween the parties, including but not limited to any dispute arising over the terms and condi-
tions of this Agreement or in any manner relating to this Agreement... shall be submitted
upon the written demand of either party to arbitration ... Id. at 788.
78. Id.
79. See id. at 788 - 89. Dr. Morohunfola alleged breach of contract, breach of fiduci-
ary relationship, fraud, and fraud in the inducement. See id. at 789.
80. Id. at 791.
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tract and to have known their meaning, and he must be held to have
known and fully comprehended the legal effect of the contract."
81
Dr. Morohunfola also argued that Wee Tots waived its right to arbitra-
tion by substantially invoking the judicial process before seeking arbitra-
tion. The following two-pronged test was applied by the court in
determining whether waiver of the right to compel arbitration had oc-
curred: (1) "did the party seeking arbitration substantially invoke the ju-
dicial process"; and (2) "did the opposing party prove that it suffered
prejudice as a result."'8 2 Applying this test and taking a case-by-case and
totality-of-the-circumstances approach, Justice Holman found no
waiver.83 Although Wee Tots had served nineteen interrogatories, six-
teen admissions requests, and thirty-nine requests for production prior to
seeking arbitration, the court concluded (and Dr. Morohunfola acknowl-
edged) that the discovery would be of use in the arbitration.8 4 Resolving
doubts regarding waiver in favor of arbitration, the court held that the
trial court clearly abused its discretion in not compelling the arbitration
of Dr. Morohunfola's claims. Accordingly, conditional mandamus relief
was granted and a writ would be issued if the trial court failed to vacate
its prior order and did not grant Wee Tots' motion to compel.
8 5
Poly-America and Wee Tots Pediatric make clear that employment arbi-
tration is and will continue to be an established feature of employment
law and policy. While employers can go too far in asking and requiring
employees to agree to waive statutory rights and remedies, as did the
employer in Poly-America, arbitration agreements continue to be en-
forced where statutory rights can be effectively vindicated in an arbitral
forum and where the court concludes that it is doing nothing more than
holding employees (and, according to a recent decision, a deceased em-
ployee's beneficiaries) 86 to the agreement to arbitrate employment-re-
lated claims and disputes.
IV. WHISTLEBLOWERS
The Texas Whistleblower Act 87 protects employees from the adverse
personnel actions of state and local government employers taken against
employees who make good-faith reports of violations of law to law en-
81. Id. (quoting Tamez v. Sw. Motor Transp., Inc., 155 S.W.3d 564, 570 (Tex. App.-
San Antonio 2004, no pet.)).
82. Id. at 792.
83. Id. Factors considered in the totality-of-circumstances analysis include when the
party moving for arbitration knew of the arbitration clause, "how much discovery ha[d]
been conducted, who initiated the discovery, whether [the discovery] related to the merits
rather than arbitrability or standing," the utility of the discovery in arbitration, and
whether the party seeking to compel arbitration sought judgment on the merits. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 793.
86. See In re Labatt Food Serv., L.P., 279 S.W.3d 640 (Tex. 2009) (arbitration provision
between employer and deceased employee signed before the employee's death required
the deceased's beneficiaries, who did not sign the agreement, to arbitrate their wrongful
death claims against the employer).




In Montgomery County v. Park,89 David Park, a patrol lieutenant with
the sheriff's department of Montgomery County (who also served as the
security coordinator for the county's convention center events), informed
his administrative assistant that a county commissioner had allegedly
made graphically sexual comments about her and another employee.90
Subsequently informed by his assistant and another administrative assis-
tant of a number of instances of sexual harassment by the same commis-
sioner, Park reported the commissioner's conduct to the sheriff, and the
county commenced an investigation. While the investigation was in pro-
gress, the commissioner allegedly ordered that Park be relieved of his
security coordinator responsibilities; those duties were initially trans-
ferred to the constable's office before being rotated between the consta-
ble's and sheriff's offices. Alleging that the reassignment of the security
coordinator duties was retaliation for his reporting of the commissioner's
asserted misconduct, Park filed a lawsuit alleging that the county violated
the Whistleblower Act.91
Chief Justice Jefferson, writing for the Texas Supreme Court on a mat-
ter of first impression, noted that the Whistleblower Act defined "person-
nel action" but did not define "adverse. '92 In his view definition of the
latter term required "a careful balancing. '93 The protection of employees
who in good faith report violations of law encourages reporting and the
reduction of illegal conduct by governments and employees. "Requiring
too high a level of adversity would defeat this important purpose. ' 94 But
"setting the standard too low could... saddle the public with the cost of
defending against unmeritorious claims-in terms of litigation expenses
and in chilling innocuous personnel actions that an employee may per-
ceive as subjectively adverse. '95
Chief Justice Jefferson found guidance for the resolution of the
Whistleblower Act issue in the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White,96 wherein the
Court concluded that a plaintiff alleging a violation of the anti-retaliation
88. State and local governments "may not suspend or terminate the employment of, or
take other adverse personnel action against, a public employee who in good faith reports a
violation of law by the employing governmental entity or another public employee to an
appropriate law enforcement authority." § 554.002(a). A report to an "appropriate law
enforcement authority" is made if "the authority is part of a state or local government
entity or of the federal government that the employee in good faith believes is authorized
to... regulate under or enforce the law alleged to be violated in the report" or "investigate
or prosecute a violation of criminal law." § 554.001(b).
89. 246 S.W.3d 610 (Tex. 2007).
90. See id. at 612-13.
91. See id.
92. A "personnel action" is "an action that affects a public employee's compensation,
promotion, demotion, transfer, work assignment, or performance evaluation .... " Id. at
613.
93. Id. at 614.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. 548 U.S. 53 (2006).
1108 [Vol. 62
Employment Law
provision of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196497 must demonstrate
that "a reasonable employee would have found the challenged action ma-
terially adverse, which in this context means it might well have dissuaded
a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimina-
tion."' 98 Adopting and modifying the Burlington standard, Chief Justice
Jefferson stated:
We hold that a personnel action is adverse within the meaning of the
Whistleblower Act if it would be likely to dissuade a reasonable, sim-
ilarly situated worker from making a report under the Act. This ob-
jective test strikes an appropriate balance between the need to shield
whistleblowers ... and the need to protect government employers
from baseless suits, and, in addition, provides lower courts with a
judicially manageable standard.99
Did Park suffer an adverse personnel action? Answering that question
in the negative, Chief Justice Jefferson noted that Park did not argue that
the reassignment of his security coordinator responsibilities "affected his
prestige, opportunity for advancement in the department, or the difficulty
of his work conditions ...."100 Park's pay was not reduced and he was
not barred from seeking and obtaining outside employment. While Park
did have the ability as security coordinator to assign himself extra work at
events at the convention center, there was "no evidence that losing the
first choice of extra jobs . . . actually reduced Park's earnings." 10 1 Com-
paring Park's loss of the coordinator duties to the reassignment of work
challenged by the employee in the Supreme Court's Burlington deci-
sion,10 2 Chief Justice Jefferson concluded that, as a matter of law, Mont-
gomery County did not violate the Whistleblower Act.103
It can be argued that the supreme court did not recognize the legal and
practical significance of the non-monetary aspects of the alleged retalia-
tion challenged by Park. An employee reports, in good faith, that a high-
level official has engaged in serious misconduct and loses a position. If,
as the supreme court declares, the focus of the analysis must be on the
likelihood that a reasonable, similarly situated employee would be dis-
suaded from making a report, it is by no means clear that removing an
employee from a position the employee would have continued to hold if
he had not reported sexual harassment or other misconduct does not or
may not send a message that the whistleblower law will not shield report-
ers. And one must wonder what message is sent to the other employees
who shared their concerns with Park when they learned that the reassign-
97. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17. (2000); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2000).
98. 548 U.S. at 68 (internal quotation marks omitted).
99. 246 S.W.3d at 614.
100. Id. at 615.
101. Id.
102. The Burlington employee-plaintiff was reassigned from her forklift operator job to
a less desirable track laborer position and was suspended without pay for thirty-seven days
(including through the Christmas holiday season) before receiving back pay as the result of
a successful grievance. See 548 U.S. at 58-59, 72.
103. 246 S.W.3d at 616.
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ment of part of his duties was not deemed to be an unlawful response to
his efforts to bring to light alleged sexual harassment. The disincentive to
report, which is grounded in the concern about and fear of retaliation,
does not only deter the person blowing the whistle. That concern and
fear can extend to others who know about but are hesitant to share and
communicate their knowledge of unlawful conduct to the whistleblower,
like the administrative assistants who provided information to Parker
about the commissioner's alleged acts of sexual harassment. 104
The Whistleblower Act and the meaning and scope of the anti-retalia-
tion provision of the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act
(CHRA) 10 5 were addressed by the Texas Supreme Court in City of Waco
v. Lopez. 10 6 In August 2001, Robert Lopez was transferred (according to
the city, because of complaints about his attitude) from his position as
Waco's chief plumbing inspector to a job in the plumbing code enforce-
ment division.10 7 Lopez filed a grievance with the city's equal employ-
ment opportunity (EEO) officer and complained that he was transferred
because of his age and race. Transferred back to his original job, Lopez
was subsequently discharged in October 2001 for taking a city vehicle to
Austin, Texas, without prior approval and contrary to the city's policy.
Lopez then sued Waco under the Whistleblower Act, alleging that he
was fired in retaliation for the grievance he filed with the EEO officer. 108
Waco argued that the CHRA was Lopez's exclusive remedy for his claim
of retaliatory discharge. The CHRA provides that it is unlawful for an
employer to retaliate "against a person who, under this chapter: (1) op-
poses a discriminatory practice; (2) makes or files a charge; (3) files a
complaint; or (4) testifies, assists, or participates in any manner in an in-
vestigation, proceeding, or hearing." 10 9
Justice Dale Wainwright's opinion for the supreme court reasoned that
Lopez's internal grievance submitted to the city's EEO officer did impli-
cate the anti-retaliatory provision of the CHRA. Yet, Lopez contended
that his claim was brought under the Whistleblower Act, arguing that he
never filed a complaint with or otherwise invoked the CHRA. Justice
Wainwright rejected that argument. °10 In his view, Lopez's age and race
discrimination complaint to Waco's EEO officer and allegation that he
was discharged for making that complaint involved proscribed retaliation
for opposing conduct made unlawful by the CHRA "irrespective of the
merits of the underlying discrimination claim."'' The CHRA's anti-re-
taliation provision "covers a wide array of situations in which discrimina-
104. See Deborah L. Brake, Retaliation, 90 MINN. L. REV. 18, 20 (2005) ("Fear of retali-
ation is the leading reason why people stay silent instead of voicing their concerns about
bias and discrimination.").
105. See TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. §§ 21.001-21.556 (Vernon 2006 & Supp. 2008).
106. 259 S.W.3d 147 (Tex. 2008).
107. See id. at 149 - 50.
108. See id.
109. TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 21.055.




tion may have been alleged by the employee or someone else," and "[a]n
internal grievance alleging conduct that is actually prohibited by the
CHRA reasonably equates to opposition to discriminatory conduct
'under' the CHRA, regardless of whether a formal CHRA complaint has
been filed. The touchstone is not availment, but availability of the
CHRA remedies."'1 12 As for Lopez's argument that the CHRA did not
apply because he never invoked that statute, Justice Wainwright cau-
tioned that requiring an employee to make an express invocation of that
statute "as a predicate to pursuing a retaliation claim" could result in the
avoidance of liability by the employer who "swiftly fir[es] the employee.
Such an absurd result cannot be intended by the Legislature."' 1 3
Lopez argued that, because the CHRA did not preclude his
Whistleblower Act claim, he could choose to proceed under either stat-
ute. For Justice Wainwright, this argument presented the question
whether the Texas legislature "intended to allow a claimant to elect be-
tween two remedial schemes addressing essentially the same conduct but
providing different procedures and remedies." ' 1 4 Examining and com-
paring (1) the Whistleblower Act's procedures and general remedy for
retaliation for reporting violations of law and (2) the CHRA's prohibition
of "the specific evil of discrimination and retaliation in the workplace"
and comprehensive remedial scheme,115 the Justice concluded that
the statutes provide irreconcilable and inconsistent regimes for rem-
edying employer retaliation .... If allowed to bring their claims
under the Whistleblower Act, public employees would have little in-
centive to submit to the administrative process the Legislature con-
sidered necessary to help remedy discrimination in the workplace.
Such a result would frustrate clear legislative intent." 6
Consequently, Justice Wainwright determined, "the Whistleblower Act
must yield to the CHRA for retaliation claims arising from allegations of
employment discrimination made unlawful under the CHRA."117 Be-
cause Lopez had not invoked CHRA procedures and had not pled a
CHRA cause of action, the supreme court dismissed his case." 8
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 153.
115. Id. at 153 - 54. Justice Wainwright noted that the CHRA's regulatory scheme
includes administrative review, alternative dispute resolution, and a requirement of ex-
haustion of administrative remedies, and that the Texas Workforce Commission's civil
rights division receives and investigates complaints of workplace discrimination and is em-
powered to resolve and settle cases in which the agency determines that there is reasonable
cause to believe that the law has been violated. See id. at 154.
116. Id. at 154, 155.
117. Id. It must be noted that the supreme court limited its holding to claims of retalia-
tory discharge based on harms addressed and redressed by the CHRA and did not express
any opinion as to whether a Whistleblower Act retaliation claim may be available under






General Electric Co. v. Moritz 1 9 asked and answered in the negative
the question of whether a landowner must warn an independent contrac-
tor's employee of obvious hazards already known to the employee. Ar-
thur Moritz was an employee of an independent contractor that delivered
General Electric (GE) parts to customers. 120 While loading product onto
his pickup truck on a ramp at the GE warehouse (the ramp had six-inch
curbs but did not have guard rails), Moritz attempted to add a bungee
cord to secure the load. "[T]he cord broke while he was leaning back to
stretch it" and Moritz fell from the side of the ramp, fracturing his hip,
pelvis, and thumb. 121 He sued GE and others, alleging that the owners
and occupiers of the premises were liable for negligent activities and
premises conditions. The trial court granted summary judgment for the
defendants; the Fort Worth Court of Appeals, finding fact questions pre-
cluding summary judgment, reversed. 122 A divided Texas Supreme Court
reversed the court of appeals.123
Justice Scott A. Brister, writing for the majority, 124 concluded that no
fact question existed with regard to Moritz's negligent activity theory.
Justice Brister pointed out that, as a general matter, an owner or occupier
has no duty to ensure that independent contractors perform their work
safely, and that "one who retains a right to control the contractor's
work," by contract or implied by conduct, "may be held liable for negli-
gence in exercising that right."1 25 The summary judgment record con-
tained no evidence that Moritz's duties were governed by contract, and
there was no evidence that GE controlled how or where Moritz secured
his delivery load. 126 The Court explained that:
[any GE] control of where Moritz could load supplies did not dictate
where he could secure that load .... Moritz admitted at his deposi-
tion that he could have driven off the ramp before securing his load.
As an independent contractor, Moritz was free to choose whatever
vehicle he wanted for deliveries, and when, where, and how he
would secure his load. 127
In the absence of contractual or actual control of Moritz's decisions Jus-
tice Brister saw no fact question as to Moritz's negligent activity
theory. 128
119. 257 S.W.3d 211 (Tex. 2008).
120. See id. at 213 - 14.
121. Id. at 214.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 213.
124. Joined by Justices Nathan L. Hecht, Dale Wainwright, David Medina, and Don R.
Willett.
125. Id. at 214.
126. See id.




Justice Brister also rejected Moritz's argument that the defendants had
a duty to warn Moritz that the ramp from which he fell did not have
guardrails. 129 A landowner is only liable to an independent contractor's
employees for claims arising from a concealed, pre-existing defect: the
"'owner or occupier has a duty to inspect the premises and warn of con-
cealed hazards the owner knows or should have known about.'"130 Jus-
tice Brister observed that the absence of rails on the loading ramp "was
obviously a pre-existing condition and obviously not a concealed haz-
ard."'1 31 GE had no duty to warn Moritz. "If owners and occupiers have
no duty to warn an independent contractor of open and obvious defects,
the defendants had no duty to warn Moritz that the ramp he had been
using for more than a year had no handrails."'1 32 Rather than place a
duty to warn on owners and occupiers in the circumstances before the
supreme court, Justice Brister argued that "[p]lacing the duty on an inde-
pendent contractor to warn its own employees or make safe open and
obvious defects ensures that the party with the duty is the one with the
ability to carry it out."'1 33
In an age of an ever-increasing number of workers considered to be
and categorized as independent contractors, the supreme court's focus on
a worker's legal status in determining whether an owner and occupier has
a duty to warn those who are performing work on their premises about
dangerous conditions is an important development. As the dissenting
Justices noted in Moritz, only the landowner has control over and can
change an unsafe condition; the employee of the independent contractor
does not have such control and has no authority to make what she be-
lieves to be safety-enhancing improvements.13 4 But the result in Moritz is
at least plausible and undoubtedly persuasive to many, given the record
evidence and the scenario involving a worker who was familiar with GE's
operation and knew of the absence of guard rails which may have pro-
vided some measure of protection for those falling while working on the
loading ramp, as opposed to a situation involving a worker new to and
unaware of his surroundings.
129. Id. at 215.
130. Id. (quoting Shell Oil Co. v. Khan, 138 S.W.3d 288, 295 (Tex. 2004)).
131. Id.
132. Id. at 216. "If Moritz wanted to use bungee cords and lean over backwards, that
was his business; but he could not require GE to keep him safe no matter how he chose to
do his own work." Id. at 217.
Justice Paul W. Green's dissent, joined by Chief Justice Jefferson and Justice Phil John-
son, argued that Moritz "had no authority to alter the premises conditions, and thus could
not require that guard rails be placed along the ramp for his safety. Moritz controlled only
the specific location and manner in which he loaded his truck." Id. at 219 (Green, J.,
dissenting). Justice Green would not "cling to false distinctions based on independent con-
tractor status or control over Moritz's activities . I..." d  at 221. He would focus, instead,
on "who actually had control over the premises condition. Neither Moritz nor his em-
ployer had control over the premises condition that resulted in Moritz's injury." Id. Be-
cause only GE could address and change that condition, "GE owed a duty to either warn
Moritz of the dangerous premises condition or to make it safe." Id.
133. Id. at 216.
134. Id. at 219.
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In Brookshire Grocery Co. v. Goss,135 an employee of a grocery store,
Barbara Goss, was retrieving items from a deli cooler and stepped over a
"lowboy" loading cart stocked two to three feet high with frozen turkey
and ham dinners. 36 Retrieving items from the cooler, Goss turned to
leave and hit her shin on the lowboy; reaching out for a shelf to avoid
falling, she injured her back and was taken to the hospital and remained
under medical care.137 Goss sued her employer and claimed that it negli-
gently failed to warn employees of the risk of maneuvering around the
lowboy loading carts.' 38 Finding for Goss, a jury awarded damages for
physical pain, mental anguish, loss of earning capacity, physical impair-
ment, and medical expenses; that judgment was affirmed by the Texar-
kana Court of Appeals.
The Texas Supreme Court began its analysis by noting that "we have
held that an employer 'owes no duty to warn of hazards that are com-
monly known or already appreciated by the employee."'1 39 The supreme
court found no evidence "that keeping a loaded lowboy in a cooler was
unusually dangerous. A stationary, loaded lowboy is easily visible, and
Goss saw it upon entering the cooler. To the extent that stepping over a
lowboy is dangerous, it is a danger apparent to anyone, including
Goss.' 140 Moreover, the supreme court continued, Goss had encoun-
tered lowboys during the course of her employment and safely navigated
around the lowboy when she entered the cooler. Because stepping over a
cart is "a risk commonly known and appreciated," the supreme court con-
cluded that the employer had no duty to warn Goss and reversed the
court of appeals' judgment.' 41
VI. THE DRAM SHOP ACT
20801, Inc. v. Parker142 called upon the Texas Supreme Court to inter-
pret, for the first time, the "safe harbor" provision of the Texas Dram
Shop Act.' 43 In November 1999, John Parker attended the grand open-
ing of a Harris County Slick Willie's pool hall (operated by 20801,
Inc.). 144 According to Parker, bar employees served him ten to fifteen
alcoholic beverages (including two free drinks provided by the manager).
The manager asked Parker to leave the establishment after Parker and
135. 262 S.W.3d 793 (Tex. 2008) (per curiam).
136. The "lowboy cart measures roughly two-and-a-half feet by five feet and its bed sits
about ten inches off the ground. It has four wheels and a handle on one end and measures
about forty-two inches from the ground up." Id. at 794 n.1.
137. See id. at 794.
138. The employer was a nonsubscriber under the Texas Workers' Compensation Act
and was, thus, subject to the negligence suit brought by Goss. Id. at 794 n.2.
139. Id. at 794 (quoting Kroger Co. v. Elwood, 197 S.W.3d 793, 794 (Tex. 2006)); see
also Jack in the Box, Inc. v. Skiles, 221 S.W.3d 566, 568 (Tex. 2007).
140. 262 S.W.3d at 795.
141. Id.
142. 249 S.W.3d 392 (Tex. 2008).
143. See TEX. ALCO. BEV. CODE ANN. §§ 2.02(b), 106.14(a) (Vernon 2007 & Supp.
2008).
144. 249 S.W.3d at 394.
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another customer, Anthony Griffin, were involved in an argument.
While in the parking lot, Griffin punched Parker and Parker fell, striking
his head on the pavement.
Alleging that he suffered a fractured skull and disabling brain injuries
as a result of this altercation, Parker sued Slick Willie's under the Texas
Dram Shop Act. 145 Specifically, Parker asserted that Slick Willie's and its
agents and/or employees were negligent in providing intoxicating alco-
holic beverages and liquor to Parker and Griffin when Slick Willie's
"knew or should have known that they had become obviously intoxicated
to such a degree as to present a clear and present danger to themselves
and others ... and that such intoxication was a proximate cause of the
damages suffered by Parker.' 1 46 Slick Willie's successfully moved for
summary judgment. The Houston Court of Appeals reversed in part,
holding that the employer had not satisfied the Dram Shop Act's safe
harbor provision-i.e., had not established that it "had not directly or
indirectly encouraged its employees to violate the law."
147
The Texas Supreme Court, per Chief Justice Jefferson, disagreed with
the court of appeals. The supreme court explained that the Dram Shop
Act imposes liability on providers of alcoholic beverages for those dam-
ages proximately caused by intoxicated persons "who were served despite
being obviously drunk.' 1 48 The safe harbor provision of the statute (Sec-
tion 106.14(a)), "apparently unique to Texas,"' 14 9 eliminates liability in the
following circumstances: (1) where the employer required its employees
to attend approved seller training programs; (2) an employee attended
the training program; and (3) the employer "has not directly or indirectly
encouraged the employee to violate such law."1 5 0 As it was not contested
that Slick Willie's had complied with the first two safe harbor elements,
the parties and the supreme court focused on the third element.
The supreme court concluded, first, that while the burden of establish-
ing the first two elements of the safe harbor provision lies with the prov-
iders, plaintiffs bear the burden of showing the third element-that the
employer directly or indirectly encouraged an employee to "over-
serve.' 5 1 In so concluding the supreme court opined that requiring prov-
iders to prove that they did not "encourage employees to over-serve
would be an inefficient and uneconomical use of judicial resources," and
that "as a practical matter, proving a negative is always difficult and fre-
quently impossible."' 52
145. Parker also sued under a premises liability theory. The trial court's grant of sum-





149. Id. at 395 - 96.
150. Id. at 396 (quoting TEX. ALCO. BEV. CODE ANN. § 106.14(a)).
151. Id. at 397.
152. Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
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Turning next to Slick Willie's argument that employers are not liable
unless they knowingly encourage employees to violate the law or were
consciously indifferent to employees' violations, the supreme court dis-
agreed with the argument "that the plain meaning of encourage necessa-
rily implies knowing conduct. Although encouragement is generally
intentional, it is possible, under certain circumstances, for providers to
negligently encourage their employees to violate the law."'153 The su-
preme court thus concluded that to "encourage" its employees "a pro-
vider must act (or fail to act) at least negligently . "154 In making the
negligence determination, the supreme court instructed that an em-
ployer's challenged conduct will be compared to "a reasonable provider
of the defendant's type (a bar or liquor store owner, for example), and
the circumstances in these cases will include a provider's awareness of,
and reliance on, its employees' successful completion of an approved
seller training program. '155
Slick Willie's argued further that the court of appeals erred when it
required Slick Willie's "to 'prove enforcement of its alcohol policies on a
particular occasion to satisfy the third element of [section 106.14(a)].'"t 56
The supreme court agreed. The safe harbor provision does not require
that providers create formal policies, and the provider is relieved of liabil-
ity for the conduct of an employee who, having been trained and with no
employer encouragement, violates the law. "A provider otherwise quali-
fying for this protection, then, would need to invoke it only when its pol-
icy was not enforced-thus, under the court of appeals' interpretation,
section 106.14(a) would be of no practical use."'157 The supreme court
decided that it would not require a provider meeting its burden under
section 106.14(a) to demonstrate enforcement at the time of the particu-
lar event giving rise to a lawsuit.158
Applying this analysis to Parker's suit against Slick Willie's, the su-
preme court noted the absence of record evidence of the employer's di-
rect or indirect encouragement that its employees violate the law. There
was no evidence that Parker was obviously drunk when the manager
served him two free drinks. As the supreme court opined, "serving two
free drinks to a person who is not obviously intoxicated is neither a viola-
tion of the Act nor does it encourage others to violate the Act.' 59
Interestingly, the Court recognized that the standard announced in its
decision could not have been reasonably anticipated by Parker and re-
manded the case to the trial court so that Parker could conduct more
153. Id. at 398.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. (quoting Parker v. 20801, Inc., 194 S.W.3d 556, 565 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 2006, pet. granted), rev'd by 249 S.W.3d 392 (Tex. 2008)).
157. Id. at 399.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 399 - 400.
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discovery and present additional evidence. 160 The statute's text and the
supreme court's interpretation and application thereof would appear to
be major obstacles for Parker. The "unique" safe harbor provision pro-
vides a defense for and insulates from liability those employers who com-
ply with section 106.14(a) in training their employees and do not
encourage their workers to violate the Dram Shop Act. Further, the
Court's placement of the burden of proof on plaintiffs, who must now
show that the employer-provider directly or indirectly encouraged an em-
ployee to over-serve, is significant. As in all areas of law, the party who
must demonstrate certain facts in order to prevail faces and must grapple
with the reality that its prospects of success will or may be diminished by
the allocation of the burden of proof. Whether Parker will be able to
make the requisite showing will shed light on the operative meaning and
consequences of the Court's decision.
VII. CONCLUSION
The employment law cases discussed in the preceding parts of this Arti-
cle addressed important issues in the areas of jury selection and race-
based challenges, employment arbitration, the still developing law of the
scope and limits of whistleblower protection, employment-related tort ac-
tions, and an employer's reliance on the training of its employees as a
statutory defense to a plaintiff's allegation that the negligent over-serving
of an obviously intoxicated individual was the proximate cause of dam-
ages suffered by that person. As can be seen, employment law includes a
range of issues, claims, and work-related contexts. This survey's selective
and non-exhaustive discussion provides only a sampling of the important
employment law developments and judicial decisions issued in the No-
vember 2007 - October 2008 Survey period.
160. Id. at 400.
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